In this paper, I will outline some fundamental differences between the evaluative and explanatory language of Aristotelian practical reason based on his empirical psychological theory of individual human development, on the one hand, and the 20th and 21st century discourse of human rights based on a transcendent principle of universal human dignity on the other. To what extent are these two types of political discourse compatible in today's globalizing world? To the extent that they are not compatible, which should be preferred? My answer is that they are compatible but only if the Aristotelian framework is treated as more fundamental, and the rights-and-dignity perspective is understood as a potentially good political solution, for the time being, in the contemporary context of global politics.
Since the adoption of the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 the belief that a commitment to human rights should be the core of everyone's (and every culture's) normative perspective on world politics has become very widespread and is by now embedded in a wide variety of international and regional institutions and treaties. And yet even as the influence of the idea of universal human rights has spread across the globe, at the same time the attempt to articulate a non-religious or non-sectarian philosophical justification for the doctrine of universal human rights, usually involving an assertion of equal "dignity" as a characteristic of all human beings, has not been as successful. Some critics have argued that this failure to persuasively justify the international human rights "regime" suggests that the global politics of human rights is simply an assertion of provincial Western norms. 1 I will argue that the contemporary articulations of human rights indeed rest on a neo-Kantian (and hence postChristian) Western (and hence modern 2 ) philosophical foundation. 3 As a result, I argue that it 1 The post-1948 human rights regime was understood by its founders as a bulwark against totalitarian or other forms of injustice, and some now see it as, potentially, an obstacle to the hegemony of global capital. For a philosophically and politically informed account of the controversies surrounding the meaning of the UDHR from the time of its writing to the present, see Glendon 2001. On the other hand, critics of the human rights regime worry that it is an ideological strategy, conscious or not, for the advancement of global capital and the states allied with it. The most prominent version of this critique is the post-Marxist account of Hardt and Negri 2002, criticized by Habermas 2006, pp. 187-188 . See also the essays by Brown 2004 and Wallach 2005 , who argue that the entrenchment of rights language as theoretically foundational is an obstacle to the realization of the highest aspirations of strong democracy and "progressive" politics. A milder and reformist but still telling line of critique is that the doctrine of human rights, not in essence but as sometimes currently understood, is a deceptively alluring vehicle for the imposition of European political culture on the rest of the world. See Mutua 2002 . A similarly reformist critique of contemporary human rights doctrine is proposed in several of the essays in Bauer and Bell 1999. Other noteworthy recent attempts aim at rescuing human rights talk from its links to Western individualism and capitalism by reconceiving human rights on the basis of a picture of humanity as characterized by certain basic weaknesses as well as by unique dignity. See Butler 2004 and 2010 ("There are ways of framing that will bring the human into view in its frailty and precariousness, that will allow us to stand for the value and dignity of human life…" 2010: 77) and Meister 2011. My own political position is in the camp of those theorists trying to re-situate rights talk rather than replace it, but my (Aristotelian) orientation is quite different from modernist and post-modernist accounts. For an attempt to combine Kantian agency and dignity with an Aristotelian view of human vulnerability, see Nussbaum 2011: 127: "What makes Aristotle of continuing centrality for political thought is the way in which he coupled an understanding of choice and its importance with an understanding of human vulnerability." 2 By the "West" I mean the cultural world that historically emerges from and is the secular successor to European Christendom. Both medieval "Christendom" and the modern "West" attempt to appropriate Plato and Aristotle for their own ends, usually treating them as venerable points of departure to be overcome by newer and truer teachings of later theology and philosophy. My argument is that this is a serious mistake, and that the great usefulness of Plato and Aristotle is as an open-ended challenge to prevailing views. 3 I think Michael Rosen's empirical claim about the meaning and significance of dignity in contemporary world politics is accurate (2012:1-2): "Dignity is central to modern human rights discourse, the closest that we have to an internationally accepted framework for the normative regulation of political life, and it is embedded in numerous constitutions, international conventions, and declarations." My critique of the concept of dignity and the metaphysical dualism that supports it draws on two recent excellent "prodignity" books by Rosen and by George Kateb (2011) . Both Kateb and Rosen stress the weight of the Kantian understanding of dignity (Würde) in contemporary political discourse and practice, and both stress the centrality of the element of autonomy, as opposed to natural heteronomy, in the Kantian version of dignity. Kateb is worth quoting at length on this: "In the idea of human dignity to recognize oneself as sharing in a common humanity with every human being is the primordial component of individual identity. Its positive center, however, is the belief in one's uniqueness together with the uniqueness of every human being. Analogously, the dignity of the human species lies in its uniqueness in a world of species. I am what no one else is, while not existentially superior to anyone else; we human beings belong to a species that is what no other species is; it is the highest species on earth-so far. . . . Only the human species is, in the most important existential respects, a break with nature and significantly not natural. It is unique among species in not being only natural. Of course, if the species breaks with nature, so must makes sense, philosophically, to consider as an alternative to human rights talk Aristotle's (preChristian and pre-Western) normative focus on practical reason (phronêsis), backed up theoretically by a revised version of his idea of the possibilities and problems of human development, those which are implicit in biologically inherited, species-specific, human nature.
As an initial clarification of the difference between the two frameworks or lenses, we might say that Aristotle's position is a non-reductive naturalism that rests on an analogy between the human good the idea of physical or bodily health that underlies the practice of medicine, although determining the human good, universally and in context, is always much more difficult than determining physical or bodily health. The human rights framework, by contrast, rests on the premise of the essential and uniquely human transcendence of mere animal nature, the transcendence, in Kantian-and also Hegelian and Marxian-terms, from the Realm of Necessity into the Realm of Freedom. 4 One major advantage of the Aristotelian alternative is that it is much more open to responses from a variety of communities than is human rights discourse. Finally, I raise the question of whether Aristotelian naturalism, properly understood, might even provide the starting point for a more satisfying and more inclusive philosophical justification for the contemporary politics of universal human rights than any neo-Kantian appeal to the all too parochial standard of human dignity.
The aim of my essay, then, is to argue that there is something wrong with the currently dominant paradigm in international political theory, and to suggest the desirability of considering a new and explicitly Aristotelian paradigm or framework to contest and to complement (but not to drive out) our theoretical status quo. But first I need to say a word about terms. When we every individual member of it" (2011:17). Kateb's work is especially valuable because, unlike other dignity and rights theorists, he acknowledges the character of his Kantian dualism and the problems, both explanatory and normative, that it raises. 4 For Kant, we have two "natures": "Nature has endowed us with two distinct abilities for two distinct purposes, namely that of man as an animal species and that of man as a moral species." Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History, PW (H. Reiss ed., Nisbet trans.), 228n. I have learned much from Velkley's (2002) account of this dualist turn in modern Western philosophizing speak of "paradigms", or "imaginaries", or "prejudices", or "cultures", we seek to identify those often unself-conscious presuppositions that define the limits of discourse within a given community. The problem with all these terms is that they misleadingly suggest a false concreteness and coherence to those often changeable and overlapping collections of presuppositions, turning an unstable aggregate of beliefs and opinions into a discoursestructuring agent, something like an Hegelian Zeitgeist. This is especially true of the word "culture," but it is also true of "paradigm." So from this point on, I propose to substitute for these totalizing terms Aristotle's word endoxa, which refers to the prevailing opinions about fundamental matters within a community, opinions that can be examined in terms of their accuracy and fruitfulness as guides to understanding and acting in the world. 5 I will argue that the current NeoKantian theoretical endoxa have two serious flaws as guides of this kind: they assume the necessity of theoretical precision as the normative core of political philosophy, and they assume the truth of a sort of metaphysical dualism that contrasts human freedom with natural necessity. 6 My proposal for an Aristotelian alternative is intended to incorporate the current endoxa within a broader, more open, and possibly more accurate framework for practical philosophy; I aim at reorientation rather than wholesale replacement, at "saving" the endoxa or "phenomena," 7 rather than replacing them. And while the basis for my proposal is my 5 The Aristotelian equivalent for "culture" or "paradigm" is the "endoxa," the leading opinions that shape the thought and action of a particular society. "The endoxa are opinions about how things seem that are held by all or by the many or by the wise--that is, by all the wise, or by the many among them, or by the most notable (gnôrimoi) and endoxic (endoxoi, most famous) of them." Topics 100b21ff. The fact that Aristotle identifies a belief as respected does not imply that he finds it true, or even respectable; nevertheless, it is clear that he regards some such opinions as indispensable for both political life and philosophic inquiry. 6 Kant, GMM, 60 (Gregor trans): "Philosophy must therefore assume that no true contradiction will be found between freedom and natural necessity in the very same human actions, for it cannot give up the concept of nature any more that that of freedom." 7 When Aristotle speaks of "saving the phenomena" (as at NE 7.1, 1145b2-7), he explicitly refers to the endoxa, and not to any perceptions or events that might underlie them. His goal is to preserve as many of these authoritative opinions as can be preserved without endorsing serious endoxic mistakes about the way the world is. With respect to defining humanity, an Aristotelian approach would treat the establishment of human rights standards as a potentially valuable political act designed to further the opportunities for well-lived individual lives, rather than, as for the NeoKantian, an expression of a commitment to an abstract (or, if not abstract, distinctly Christian or Stoic) conception of human dignity. 12 Kantian dignity attaches to human beings not because of the quality of the lives we lead but as a result of our unique power of giving reasons and acting according to them. As 11 Mara (forthcoming) presents an excellent and fruitful juxtaposition of this essay with another Greek theorist, Thucydides. 12 "The Kantian turn in contemporary political theory is characterized by a principled reliance on the idea of human dignity as underpinning notions of autonomy, individual rights, and egalitarian politics. Proponents and critics of this branch of liberal political theory view the notion of human dignity in axiomatic terms as the modern successor of honor" (Livingston and Soroko 2007: 494) . They conclude their discussion of Kant's reflections on the tension between positional honor and strict justice in Metaphysics of Morals (in his argument that the state should perhaps mitigate just punishment in the case of certain "honor killings") by noting that Kant's hesitation shows his awareness of the need not to apply the norm of universal dignity in the same way in all contexts and cases: "what Kant bumps up against here, and what he tries to systematize out of existence, is the narrowness of a strictly formal understanding of human dignity. Dignity, while a deontic concept, also has an irreducible interpretive element to it whereby what counts as respect or disrespect will always be, within some confines, a matter of contextualized judgment and deliberation" (499-500).
Charles Taylor (1994: 57) says, "Dignity is associated less with any particular understanding of the good life, such that someone's departure from this would detract from his or her own dignity, than with the power to consider and espouse for oneself some view or other." The trouble with dignity is that it is too formal and substance-begging to stand on its own and hence too easily filled with ideas from the existing endoxa, including endoxic interpretations of shared historical experiences.
By contrast, Aristotle's theoretical frame is an explicit and empirical view of human flourishing: as such, it is open to criticism in the light of experience. At the same time (quite intentionally on Aristotle's part) it is never conclusive or precise enough to be stated as an action-guiding rule or principle. Perhaps the most important difference between the Aristotelian and Kantian frameworks discussed here is their central disagreement over how to mark the essential difference between human beings and other creatures: Aristotle's prohairesis and Kant's conception of dignity. Briefly, prohairesis is the activity that combines thinking and feeling in a uniquely human way (NE 6, 1139b4-5), such that to be a human being is to act kata tên prohairesin (Pol 3, 1280a31-34); but this prohairetic (or thoughtfully chosen) life can involve acting in vicious as well as virtuous ways. For Aristotle, the fact that we are maturely and actively thoughtful in arranging our life does not guarantee that we will do it well. All good human lives are prohairetic, but not all prohairetic lives are good-NE 7 (1148a13-17; 1149b31-1150a8; 1150a16-30; 1151a5-7) makes this abundantly clear, in asserting that both virtue and vice are prohairetic dispositions, i.e., thoughtfully chosen psychic states. This makes our lives uniquely problematic, and requires continual thought about ways to address this difficulty. 13 For 13 Jill Frank's formulation is especially clear: "Prohairetic activity is, thus, characteristically human activity insofar as it discloses the character, the soul, and thereby the nature of the one who acts, specifically by revealing the degree to which, in the actions he undertakes, the actor is using the capacity for logos he possesses by virtue of being human" (Frank 2005: 34) . The Greek word prohairesis takes on a very different and quite unAristotelian meaning-that of an unequivocally desirable and infallible universalizing transcendence of local custom and law, something much more like a Kantian rational will, in Epictetus (see Stephens 2007 and Sorabji 2007) 14 Aristotle uses the term "philosophy" in an interesting variety of ways, but the two main ones are these: "first philosophy," the steady focus on the unchanging things described in NE 10 and Politics 7; and the drive to know not only "what is" (to ti) but also the "cause of what is" (to dia ti) (Eudemian Ethics 1, 1216b-1217a). This latter notion of a philosophic life is much less rarified (and much more Platonic) than the life of theôria depicted in Pol 7 and NE 10. The EE 1 passage implies that the philosophic drive for causal knowledge can be applied to any sort of object we want to understand-politics, or education, or biology, or music and art generally.
explicitly rejects. I prefer "metaphysical" 15 simply because most of the contemporary philosophizing about rights that I criticize in this paper takes for granted that it is a very good thing for political theory or philosophy to be post-metaphysical. I deny this; simply put, my claim is that we inevitably presuppose one or another theory of being whenever we theorize about anything (or any being), and that we are better off when we become aware and self-critical of the theory of being that animates our political theorizing. Metaphysics understood in the NeoKantians tend to overlook three central premises of their orientation: 1) The belief that nature is a system of externally caused motion, a system in which no action is free or self-caused; 2)
The belief that human beings are the sole beings who can escape from the realm of nature into a realm of morality and autonomy, a possibility that uniquely entitles us to dignity and respect; and
3) The belief that history is not a random collection of events, but at least potentially a narrative of irreversible progress, not of individuals but of the human species as a whole, from the dependence of the realm of nature to the freedom embodied in the realm of morals and politics.
These three propositions-that nature is a closed system of matter in law-like motion, that 18 Nussbaum (1997:42-43) McCarthy (2009: 222-223 ; italics in text) rejects the plausibility of any inquiry that goes beyond the conceptual and discursive limits imposed by the endoxic presuppositions of Western modernity. He argues that political philosophy must rule out preEnlightenment pictures of the world, not because they are false, but "because they have lost and continue to lose their discursive weight." As for postmodernism, he says this: "To begin with, the reflexivity of modern cultures has meant that modernization has been accompanied from the start by critiques of modernization. Romanticism and Marxism, Nietzsche and Weber, Gandhi and Fanon, are as integral to the discourse of modernity as the dominant ideologies they opposed. Precisely the claimed universality of that discourse leaves it semantically and pragmatically open to dissent and criticism from subordinated and excluded others. For this reason, modernity need not-indeed cannot-be left behind for some putative postmodernity; but it can be continually transformed from within. In the present connection, it is significant that the late twentieth century saw the rise of a global discourse of modernity in which postcolonial thinkers have played an increasingly important, critical and transformative role." He goes on to say that "there is little chance of radically different modernities arising and surviving in the world we live in. On the other hand, there is not only the possibility but also the reality of multiple modernities"(223). See Taylor (2004) on the possibility of "multiple modernities," but see also Yack (2005) 29 Richard Bernstein (2006) argues that Aristotle's often repeated but rarely understood warning against demanding excessive precision in practical philosophy is useful as a cure for the modern tendency to embrace either an excessively abstract universalism or a relativism that presents itself as the only alternative to a caricature of abstract universalist foundationalism. Aristotle's non-dogmatic naturalism, but contrast, by contrast, is similar to that of Wong 2006 , McDowell 1996 , MacIntyre 1999 , and Iris Murdoch: "I offer frankly a sketch of metaphysical theory, a kind of inconclusive non-dogmatic naturalism, which has the circularity of definition characteristic of such theories. . . In any case, the sketch which I have offered, a footnote in a great and familiar philosophical tradition, must be judged by its power to connect, to illuminate, to explain, and to make new and fruitful places for reflection " (1970: 44-45) . The non-dogmatic naturalist tradition with which Murdoch identifies is the one articulated most clearly, for her, by Plato. (For a similar view, see Stern on McDowell's "naturalized Platonism" [2008: 209,n.33] .) Murdoch opposes her own self-described Platonic tradition to the one that animates Western post-Kantian moral philosophy, whether, in her terms, existentialist or British analytic.
2) As a result, human rights theory treats humans as the uniquely transcendent animals. Human beings are the only creatures capable of transcending the otherwise "heteronomous" realm of nature thus understood. We alone are singular, autonomous, and creative beings. We are thus uniquely entitled to equal rights or to dignity and moral worth.
3) Since our transcendence is understood as an emergent phenomenon, progressive history is taken to be a necessary element of a meaningful human life. Human history is a coherent and essentially progressive narrative. The future will redeem the suffering of the past. A kind of perfection is a plausible outcome. Or, at the very least, if there is no such thing as progress or the possibility of progress, either toward autonomy (Kant, Hegel, Marx) or toward the reduction of suffering (Mill), individual human life may well turn out to be meaningless. The belief in human dignity gives us an ideal to strive for and live up to, rather than a problem to solve (as with Aristotle's phronêsis and prohairesis). It is not impossible to think of dignity as an inspiring end in itself, independent of any controversial metaphysical or religious foundation. By itself it might provide the basis for a kind of global civil religion. 30 But is that advantage itself a problem: by embracing the idea of progress, does modern Western philosophy abandon the pursuit of truth as its fundamental reason for being? 4) As for method, the belief that all rational philosophic discourse must be systematic. 31 And one element of systematicity is that it must aim at certainty and finality. The goal should be to aim at 30 See George Washington's "Farewell Address" on the need for simple and transcendent religious ideals to inspire civility, even if those ideals have no clear ground in nature as we experience it. 31 Charles Taylor (1989: 76-77 ) calls this "a tendency to breathtaking systematization in modern moral philosophy. Utilitarianism and Kantianism organize everything around one basic reason. And as so often happens in such cases the notion becomes accredited among proponents of these theories that the nature of moral reasoning is such that we ought to be able to unify our moral views around a single base. John Rawls, following J.S. Mill, rejects what he describes as the "intuitionist" view, which is precisely a view that allows for a plurality of such basic criteria. But to see how far this is from being an essential feature of moral thinking we have only to look at Aristotle's ethical theory. Aristotle sees us pursuing a number of goods, and our conduct as exhibiting a number of different virtues. We can speak of a single "complete good" (teleion agathon) because our condition is such that the disparate goods we seek have to be coherently combined in a single life, and in their right proportions. But the good life as a whole doesn't stand to the partial goods as a basic reason."
answering questions, once and for all, rather than provoking further inquiry. This is as true for Kant as it is for Hobbes: "[A]nyone who announces a system of philosophy as his own work says in effect that before this philosophy there was none at all. For if he were willing to admit that there had been another (and a true one), there would then be two different and true philosophies on the same subject, which is self-contradictory" (Metaphysic of Morals, Part I, Preface).
5) In ethics and politics, the belief that equal freedom is the fundamental human desideratum, the elevation of freedom to the status of ultimate value, and the rejection of the possibility of any plausible claim about universal human goods. 32 We should contrast this with the Aristotelian view of freedom as one human good among several, and his stress on developing human virtues rather than achieving freedom. Note that this does not imply that Aristotle should be treated as a modern virtue ethicist, since his focus is on how to think about human goods, human flourishing, and human psychological development, and not on how we should act in particular contexts: that should, for him, be the work of phronêsis rather than any theory, his own included.
6) The inclination to view the state as the major threat to human rights, and the concomitant underestimation of the extent to which private individuals and entities threaten human rights in ways that the state has a duty to prevent and remedy. West 2011 makes a similar critique of modern conceptions of the reasons for insisting on the rule of law. See Ignatieff 2001 on the modern state as both the major enemy to human rights and the major support for human rights.
7) The presence of a residual Christianity in modern rights talk. There is a tendency among NeoKantian rights theorists, including Rawls, Benhabib, and Habermas, to treat the modern vocabulary of human rights as a secularization of a moral doctrine that emerged first as an element of Protestant Christianity. This belief limits the possibility of conversation outside of what was once Christendom-all other sets of endoxa have to scramble to come up with equivalents for Christian or post-Christian dignity.
To be sure, there are at least three major objections that the Aristotelian approach I favor must contend with: 1) That Aristotle's metaphysics rests on a discredited or simply mistaken theory of being; 2) That Aristotle's metaphysics is essentially undemocratic in its implications; and 3) That Aristotelian theorizing cannot respond to the distinctly modern events and experiences that shape the human world as we know it. My argument is that the first two objections are misleading, while the third is valid and important, but does not lessen the need for Aristotelian theorizing as one element of our approach to understanding the world. I will take up this third objection in the last section of the paper, "Aristotle Or Kant?," where I argue against the idea that we somehow must choose between Aristotle and Kant as guides to practical reason and political choice.
How accurate as a theory of being is Aristotle's metaphysical account? Does it rely on an inaccurate and outmoded view of the cosmos? 33 Leo Strauss, while speaking of Socrates, gives a capsule summary of what I take to be the skeptical (that is, framed for the purpose of generating inquiry) rather than dogmatic character of Aristotle's metaphysics:
"Socrates was so far from being committed to a specific cosmology that his knowledge was knowledge of ignorance. Knowledge of ignorance is not ignorance. It is knowledge of the elusive character of truth, of the whole. Socrates, then, viewed man in the light of the mysterious character of the whole. He held therefore that we are more familiar with the situation of man than with the ultimate causes of that situation. We may also say he viewed man in he light of the unchangeable ideas, i.e., of the fundamental and permanent problems" (Strauss 1959:38-39; see also my 1990: 46-53) . Thomas Nagel has recently argued that the most plausible metaphysic now is a form of teleological naturalism that rejects both materialist reductionism and reliance on a creator god to explain the cosmos:
"According to the hypothesis of natural teleology, the natural world would have a propensity to give rise to beings of the kind that have a good-beings for which things can be good or bad. These are all the actual and possible forms of life. They have appeared through the historical process of evolution, but part of the explanation for the existence of that process and of the possibilities on which natural selection operates would be that they bring value into the world, in a great variety of forms" (Nagel 2013: 121, my italics) . This is in effect Aristotle's account of a cosmos characterized by living ("beings of the kind that have a good") as well as and as distinct from non-living things, where life is marked by the presence of good and bad for each species or kind of being. Nagel goes on to note that such a teleology does not at all assert that there is an overriding tendency to the emergence of a singular good that perfects the cosmos as a whole. "Rather," he continues, "it would have to be a tendency to the proliferation of complex forms and the generation of multiple variations in the range of possible complex systems" (122). Nagel notes the plainly Aristotelian character of his view of the best available understanding of the cosmos, and the extent to which it requires a revision in our understanding of the meaning and adequacy of modern natural science: "This is a throwback to the Aristotelian conception of nature, banished from the scene at the birth of modern science" (66). This is not to say that an Aristotelian metaphysic must reject modern science as false; instead, the Aristotelian sees modern science as incomplete in its explanatory power when it comes to living beings and in need of teleological supplement to understand the way objective good and bad and better and worse operate in the lives of different biological species, human beings very much included. From a political and psychological perspective, the great advantage of such a conception of nature is that it licenses us to ask questions about the healthy (and not) development of every species and of every member of each species without reaching, in a Kantian or NeoKantian way, for a separate non-natural realm of morality and freedom.
But we want our metaphysic to be accurate as well as useful. Can we be certain of the truth of Aristotelian teleology? The Aristotelian answer is that we cannot-for human beings, metaphysical questions have to remain open. The best we can do is to recognize this, and to consider the plausibility as well as the usefulness of different metaphysical conceptions.
Speaking of the accuracy of the developmental focus of Aristotle's teleology, Nagel says this:
"A naturalistic teleology would mean that organizational and developmental principles of this kind are an irreducible part of the natural order, and not the result of intentional or purposive influence by anyone [that is, not by a providential deity or by value-creating humanity]. I am not confident that this Aristotelian idea of teleology without intention makes sense, but I do not at the moment see why it doesn't" (93).
I agree that this is indeed the best we can say about the truth of Aristotle's underlying theory of being, but it is surely enough to convince us to take that theory seriously.
If this is the case, it becomes important to see that the Kantian premises can be do or what are morally right actions" (Wong 2011: 259 not only by the fact that they give more to the rich (euporoi), but also by misleading the people (dêmos). For necessarily, over time, from things falsely good there must result a true evil (kakon), and the aggrandizements (pleonexiai) of the wealthy (plousioi) are more ruinous to the regime (politeia) than those of the people (dêmos)" (Politics 4.12, 1297a7-13). For an opposed view of the significance of this passage, cf. Pangle (2013: 192) , who suggests that Aristotle is speaking "acerbically" when he says that the pleonexia of the wealthy is more ruinous of polity (politeia) than the pleonexia of the poor.
away from such tendencies, not through direct and illiberal indoctrination but through institutional arrangements and practices that counter democracy's own worst tendencies.
I think Aristotle's (and Plato's) view of the central and unique virtue of democracy resonates well with this 1858 statement attributed to Abraham Lincoln: "As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master. This expresses my idea of democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the extent of the difference, is no democracy" (Fehrenbacher 1989: 484) . This striking formulation draws attention away from treating freedom as a good in itself and toward the need
to reflect on what uses we should make of the leisure freedom provides us, whenever we are lucky enough to obtain it. The problem with anti-democratic oligarchs or aristocrats is that they entertain strong hopes of becoming, in effect, despotic and dynastic masters, if masters by consent rather than compulsion. They have no doubt that their claim to authority has more merit than that of the democratic mob. 37 Democrats, like all human beings, also wish to avoid slavery and desire mastery, but their desire for mastery is much easier to deflect because they recognize the need to work with others in order to achieve both freedom and a choiceworthy life. It is much more difficult to dissuade those who are wholly committed to the rule of the "few best" and equally to the idea that they themselves are the only conceivable aristocrats or "gentlemen." 38 I would also argue that the Kantian commitment to human dignity and to an international human rights regime resting on it is often animated, to a degree, by a fear of democratic majority tyranny rather than oligarchic despotism. Something like this fear of the inevitably illiberal tendency of democratic politics is discernible in both Kant and J. S. Mill. Robin West makes a similar point about the modern commitment to "the rule of law," a norm that, in practice and perhaps also in original intention, focuses attention on threats to the individual arising from the power of the sovereign (democratic) state, rather than seeing the function of law as "quintessentially the solution to the problem of private power." The latter idea of law, which West endorses, seems close to Aristotle's view of the proper work of nomos in human life. problematize the endoxa whose authority we too easily take for granted, and to supply a language in which prevailing opinions can be continuously examined and "saved" or rejected relative to universal norms, then we must choose Aristotle. Kant is much too close to us.
2) But why should we have to choose between either philosophers or conceptions of political philosophy? Why not say instead that political philosophy needs to undertake both of these projects, to tease out the potential for systematicity and integrity within the endoxa and to subject the endoxa to fundamental critique. The well-lived life, as Plato's Socrates asserts, requires both commitment to a particular way of life and the capacity to examine and challenge that commitment. Appiah applies this thought to the question of universal human rights in a distinctly Kongzi and Zhuangzi and Nietzsche and on and on, we are most likely to find a way into the kind of metaphysical inquiry that I suggest is essential to a more thoughtful and more rigorous 40 For an argument along these lines, see Alasdair MacIntyre (2004) . MacIntyre argues that it is a mistake to attempt to spell out a Confucian foundation for a universal human rights regime, because individual rights as we know and need them were developed in the West in response to three interrelated threats posed first by early modern European states: the massive and unprecedented concentration of technological and military power in the hands of the state; the overriding concern with adjusting conflicting economic and social interests; and "administrative rules and regulations whose complexity requires an expertise that is denied to most ordinary citizens" (216). He suggests that the Confucian tradition (and, presumably, others as well) would be best served by recognizing that we now live in a world calling for strong rights-based limits on "government and other bureaucracies," and attempting to make a place for dual identity as citizens of a modern state and members of Confucian or other partial communities: "Modern political societies cannot be communities, whether Confucian or of some other kind." While I find this persuasive, my argument is not for the establishment of MacIntyrish nonsovereign "Aristotelian" communities within the boundaries of a modern bureaucratic state. What I propose here is not some new sectarian tradition, but better theoretical education, one that finds its home not in any communal tradition but in the improved dialogic practice of liberal education in American colleges and universities. 41 "Skeptical" in the Greek rather than one of the modern senses, not as a synonym for relativism or nihilism, nor as Cartesian preparation for a future enlightened dogmatism, but as a refusal to accept any verbal formulation, however persuasive and valuable, as putting an end to our permanent need for further inquiry and dialogue about natural questions, that is, about the questions or problems we inherit biologically as human beings.
study of global political practices and institutions. Starting with Aristotle's (as well as Plato's) metaphysics is essential here not because it provides a concrete foundation for deducing psychological and political truths, but precisely because it refuses to provide such a foundation.
In style and content, but especially in style, Aristotle's metaphysics is explicitly provisional, dialogic, and open to possible doubts and objections in a way that Kant's-or any modern
Western theory of being-is not. My point is not that Aristotle supplies us with a better guide to action than Kant and the NeoKantians. Kant is closer to us and so more directly useful in deliberating about policy options in contemporary world politics. We need Aristotle as a guide to the less pressing but more fundamental questions of how to think about what we are doing and who we are.
